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Abstract
We introduce anytime mechanisms for distributed op-
timization with self-interested agents. Anytime mecha-
nisms retain good incentive properties even when inter-
rupted before the optimal solution iscomputed, and pro-
vide better quality solutions when given additional time.
Anytime mechanisms can solve easy instances of a hard
problem quickly and optimally, whileproviding approx-
imate solutions on very hard instances. In a particular
instantiation, GROWRANGE, we successively expand
the range of outcomes considered, computing the op-
timal solution for each range. Truth-revelation remains
a dominant strategy equilibrium with a stage-based in-
terruption, and is a best-response with high probability
when the interruption is time-based.
Introduction
Designing mechanisms to solve distributed optimization
problems with self-interested agents is becoming increas-
ingly important in a wide variety of settings, from e-
commerce, to the allocation of computational resources in
opensystems, to planningin multi-agentsystems. This ﬁeld,
called computationalmechanism design (CMD), aims to de-
sign solutions that are both incentive-compatible (with truth
revelation in a game-theoretic equilibrium) and tractable.
Combinatorial auctions (CAs), with agents that demand
bundles of items, are a canonical problem in CMD. All pre-
viouswork ontractableand strategyproofmechanisms(with
truth-revelationin a dominant-strategyequilibrium)for CAs
has considered restricted domains of agent preferences. For
instance, Lehmann et al. (2002) describe a fast and strat-
egyproof CA for single-minded agents that demand only
one bundle. But, there are many other examples (Mu’alem
& Nisan 2002; Archer et al. 2003; Bartal, Gonen, & Nisan
2003). These methods do not apply to the general CA prob-
lem.
In this paper, we introduce anytime mechanisms, as a
new paradigm for the design of incentive-compatible and
tractable mechanisms. Anytime mechanism will solve easy
instances of a hard family of problems quickly and opti-
mally, while returning approximate solutions and retaining
strategyproofness on very hard instances. Provable worst-
case approximationresults are droppedin favor of goodper-
formance on most problems coupled with the ability to ter-
minate the algorithm with an approximate solution on the
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very hardest of problems.1 We address the challenge of re-
taininguseful incentiveproperties,suchthat truthfulbidding
is an equilibrium whenever a mechanism is terminated.
It is worth emphasizing that a naive approach, in which
a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (see Nisan
& Ronen (2000)) is coupled with an anytime winner-
determination algorithm, would not be strategyproof unless
the algorithm has enough time to solve the problem opti-
mally. The strategyproofness of the VCG mechanism ordi-
narily relies on the optimality of its decision.
Our solution builds on maximal-in-range VCG mecha-
nisms (Nisan & Ronen 2000).We implement anytime mech-
anismsasstagedmechanisms,withanewrangeofoutcomes
considered in each stage and the optimal solution com-
puted for each new range. Importantly, the range adopted
in each stage must not depend on any information reported
by agents. In each stage we also compute the optimal solu-
tion to the problem without each agent. When interrupted,
the anytime mechanism implements the best solution found
so far, and determines VCG-based payments on the basis
of the best solutions found so far without each agent. The
mechanism will continue to compute a better solution when
provided with more time.
To understand the incentive properties we consider two
different models of interruption. First, we consider stage-
based interruptions, in which the mechanism is interrupted
after some number of stages. Truth-revelation remains a
dominant strategy equilibrium, because the ﬁnal solution is
optimal over the union of the ranges explored, with individ-
ual ranges chosen without regard to agent bids. Throughout
the paper it is importantthat the interruptioncomes from the
center, or some third-party, and not from one of the agents.
A more realistic model is one in which the interruption
process is time-based, for instance an answer might be re-
quired after 10 minutes. A new concern here is that an agent
can indirectly affect the sequence of ranges explored by
changing the difﬁculty of the problem through its bids, and
thus inﬂuence the progress made by the algorithm before in-
terruption.Our solution is to use consensus functions (Gold-
berg & Hartline 2003) to compute a conservative and agent-
independent estimate of the number of stages completed
by the time of an interruption, with results from any addi-
tional stages discarded. Together with additional assump-
1Indeed, Nisan & Ronen (2000) and Lavi et al. (2003) suggest
that no worst-case polynomial time combinatorial auction can be
strategyproof and provide good worst-case approximation proper-
ties, without assuming a restricted preference domain.tions about the maximal inﬂuence that an agent can have
on the run time, this makes truthful bidding a best-response
with high probability, whatever the bids of other agents.
We illustrate our methods in the context of CAs. We de-
ﬁne GROWRANGE, which is a particular partition-based in-
stantiation. The empirical results illustrate encouraging per-
formance on hard problems with high run time variance.
Preliminaries
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Agents report types (perhaps untruthfully) and the mech-
anism computes the outcome and payments. The challenge
is to implementan outcome with goodpropertiesdespite the
ability to misreport types. For instance, efﬁcient MD seeks
to implement a choice
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Deﬁnition 1 The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism
deﬁnes choice rule
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The VCG mechanism has the following properties:
Strategyproof: Truth-revelation is a dominant-
strategy equilibrium. Formally,
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Efﬁcient: The choice implemented in the VCG mechanism
maximizes the total value across agents, in equilibrium.
Strategyproofness is a useful property for mechanisms
because it simpliﬁes the strategic problem facing bidding
agents. An agent does not need to modelthe values or strate-
gies of other agents to compute its equilibrium strategy.
Often times the optimization problem
￿
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￿ is intractable,
for instance in CAs (Rothkopf, Pekeˇ c, & Harstad 1998). It
is interestingto considera VCG-based mechanism,in which
the optimal choice rule,
￿
.
f , is replaced with an approximate
choice rule. Everything else is left unchanged, with pay-
ments computed by applying the approximate choice rule
to solve the optimization problem without each agent.
In particular, Nisan & Ronen (2000) deﬁne maximal-in-
range VCG mechanisms.Consider some range
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Deﬁnition 2 A maximal-in-range VCG mechanism imple-
ments choice rule
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Proposition 1 (Nisan & Ronen 2000) A VCG-based mech-
anism is strategyproof if and only if it is maximal-in-range.
That maximal-in-range is sufﬁcient for strategyproof
follows immediately from the strategyproofness of VCG
mechanisms. Maximal-in-range is also necessary for strate-
gyproofnessbecause otherwise there is always a set of types
for which one agent can select the maximal choice in the
range by misreporting its type, and thus improve its utility.
Crucially, the strategyproofness of maximal-in-range ap-
proximations hinges on the agents retaining an expressive
language for outcomes in the range, and on the range being
selected independently of agent bids.
Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) have received particular at-
tention in CMD. In a CA, there is a set of
u items to allo-
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Notingthatthestrategyproofnessofthemaximal-in-range
approximation requires no restrictions on agent valuations,
one might wonder whether a maximal-in-range approxima-
tion can provide a CA that is tractable and produce reason-
able solutions. Unfortunately, the answer is negative.
Theorem 1 (Nisan & Ronen 2000) No strategyproof VCG-
based CA can be both tractable and reasonable.
In particular, an allocation is said to be reasonable if
whenever a single agent values an item that agent receives
the item in the allocation. Without reasonableness there can
be no useful worst-case guarantee on efﬁciency. Thus, this
negative result makes the case for an anytime approach.
Without this, we must either: (a) impose an a priori restric-
tion on the range that will sometimes preclude reasonable
behavior even when an instance was actually easy; or (b)
seekoptimalityandacceptthatsometimesasolutionwill not
be returned quickly; or (c) accept a loss in strategyproofness
and an unraveling of incentives.
We note, parenthetically, that although there are many
known tractable special-cases of the CAP that arise due to
restrictions on the structure of bundles (e.g. circular-ones,
consecutive-ones, two-ones) (Rothkopf, Pekeˇ c, & Harstad
1998; de Vries & Vohra 2003), and that thus suggest
maximal-in-range approximations, all of them assume an
additive-or language for bids. This language is not expres-
sive for general valuations, even on restricted ranges (unless
the range only allows each agent to receive a single bun-
dle). Moreover, introducing an expressive language, with
exclusive-or bids (Nisan 2000), requires introducing addi-
tional side constraints that break the very structure that is
required for tractability.Anytime VCG-Based Mechanisms
We use maximal-in-range VCG approximations to deﬁne
anytime VCG mechanisms. The mechanisms are deﬁned for
a sequenceof ranges
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It is critical that the sequence of ranges not depend on
the bids from agents to maintain strategyproofness. As an
example, this rules out allowing agents to submit 10 bids of
their choice, then 20 bids, then 30 bids,
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deﬁned in terms of the bundles in agent bids.2
In our staged, maximal-in-range, approach we consider a
sequence of ranges,
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Deﬁnition 3 (Anytime VCG Mechanism) Given a se-
quence of ranges
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Notethatthepaymentscanbequicklycomputedbyevalu-
ating the best solutions determinedat the end of stage
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it is not necessary to solve any additional optimization prob-
lems. Also, note that this is not simply a sequence of VCG-
based mechanisms, because the VCG payments are com-
puted in terms of the best solutions across all stages, regard-
less of the stage in which they occurred. Not all best solu-
tions (for the main problem and the problem without each
agent) need occur in the same stage.
Turningto incentives,considera stage-basedinterruption,
for instance an answer might be required after 10 stages.
More generally,the interruptioncan follow some p.d.f.
￿
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that can be known to the agents.
Theorem 2 The anytime VCG mechanism is strategyproof
for a stage-based interruption
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efﬁcient allocation if allowed to run for enough stages.
Proof: The anytime VCG mechanism is strategyproof for
any ﬁxed number of stages because the sequence of ranges
are independent of agent bids. Thus, the union over some
number of ranges deﬁned by an agent-independent distribu-
tion is itself agent independent. Efﬁciency holds once the
ﬁnal stage is implemented because this range contains all
feasible solutions.
2This scheme was proposed in Banks et al. (1989).
Avoiding Redundant Computation
A number of simple optimizations are possible to avoid the
unnecessary duplication of computation across stages.
We describe these in the context of an implementation in
which the optimization problems in each stage are formu-
lated as mixed-integerprograms, andsolved via branch-and-
cut LP-based search.But the ideas are general,and also hold
for other systematic search algorithms.
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Disjunctive Search. Constraints can be added to the for-
mulation of search in a new stage to avoid duplication
of effort with earlier searches. For instance, the problem
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￿ . This is related to the idea of “local branch-
ing” in Fischetti & Lodi (2002). In the case of CAs, this
means adding a constraint to ensure that at least one agent
receives a new bundle.
An Anytime VCG-Based Mechanism for CAs
GROWRANGE is aconcreteinstantiationofananytimeVCG
mechanismforCAs. Inparticular,itadoptsapartition-based
sequence of ranges, and considers only monotonically-
increasing sequences of ranges.
Partition-Based CAs
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Clearly, the “grand” bundle
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Loosely, we also ﬁnd it convenient to simply refer to the
bundles,
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￿ , as the range.
This leads to a concrete instantiation of a maximal-in-
range CA. Consider an exclusive-or (XOR) bidding lan-
guage (Nisan 2000), with bid
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Given these projected bids, a standard “branch-on-bid”
winner-determination algorithm such as ILOG’s CPLEX
mixed-integer programming package, or special-purpose
solvers such as CABOB (Sandholm et al. 2001) can be used
to compute the optimal solution and provide a maximal-in-
range VCG mechanism.
As an example, consider an agent with valuation
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The additional structure in a partition-based range can
also be made available to a solver by deﬁning a new set of
“dummy” items, each associated with one bundle in the par-
tition. In fact, the special structure of a partition-basedrange
providesan additionalequilibriumproperty,deﬁnedwith re-
spect to the bids submitted on the range
￿
￿ :
Theorem 3 (Holzman et al. 2001) No agent can beneﬁt by
unilaterally submitting a bid outside of a partition-based
range
￿
￿
￿ , given that bids from other agents are projected
onto
￿
￿ .
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˚ deﬁnes the size of the initial par-
tition, and parameter
¸ deﬁnes the number of reﬁnements
made in between stages:
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˚ items uniformlyat random, to
seed a separate component of
￿
˚ . Place each remaining
item uniformly at random into one of the components.
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￿ and split the component (choosing
the split uniformly at random) into two new components.
Repeat
¸ times (or until all components of the partition
are singletons).
Note that because we deﬁne reﬁnements of the partition
by this subdivision process each successive range will be
deﬁned on more and more bundles, i.e.
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simpliﬁes the anytime VCG mechanism, because the best
solutions to
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always be those computed in the most recent stage. Also,
we see that the solutions used to determine payments are
determined in the same stage as the best overall solution.
Empirical Analysis
Inpreliminarystudies,wehaveinvestigatedtheanytimeper-
formance of GROWRANGE for CAs. For winner determi-
nation, we use the IBM OSL mixed-integer programming
(MIP) solver both to solve optimization problems within
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Figure 1: Anytime performance of GROWRANGE.
each stage of GROWRANGE, as well as to compute the out-
come for the one-shot (optimal) VCG mechanism.
In testing GROWRANGE, we adapt the bid distributions
deﬁned in Sandholm (1999), but using Sandholm’s mod-
els to deﬁne valuations for agents. It is important to note
that we generate values with these distributions, and not
bid prices. In particular, we adopt an exclusive-or (XOR)
logic to deﬁne a valuation function in terms of the values
on a sparse number of bundles.3 We adapt the Weighted-
random, Random, Uniform and Decay distributions. Prob-
lem sizes are (agents/bundles-per-agent/goods): 100/4/200,
80/4/160,40/4/80,and80/4/160foreachdistributionrespec-
tively, with Sandholm’s Decay parameter set to 0.55 and
with bundles of size 5 in Uniform. We adopt parameters
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Figure1illustrates theperformanceof GROWRANGE. We
plotthe averageandmaximumruntimeofthe one-shotVCG
mechanism, along with the max, min, and average anytime
proﬁles of GROWRANGE. All results are averaged over 10
instances, and experiments were perfomed on a 4 GHz P4,
with 512 MB RAM. Note that we measure the total run
time for GROWRANGE, including the overhead for project-
ing bids and constructing partitions.
Giventhatwe userandompartitionsin GROWRANGE and
make no effort to tune the sequenceof partitions to the prob-
3It is a common misconception that these distributions provide
easy winner-determination problems. As initially deﬁned in Sand-
holm (1999) the distributions were used to deﬁne bids connected
with an additive-or bidding language. It is in this form that An-
dersson et al. (2000), and others, have shown that the Weighted
Random, Random, and to some extent the Decay distributions are
easy. We are not aware of any studies of the complexity of winner
determination when these distributions are used to generate values,
and structured as an XOR’ed set.lem domainwe ﬁndthese initial results quiteencouraging.If
a system was to use the one-shot VCG mechanism it would
need to be prepared to wait for the maximal possible run
time, because if there was ever a chance that it would be
terminated before completion then strategyproofness would
be lost and the performance would unravel. Thus, the most
interesting test for GROWRANGE is to look at its anytime
performance after some fraction of the maximal VCG run
time.
The anytime approach is most promising on problems
for which there is a large variance in solution difﬁculty
across instances. This is illustrated on Uniform, for which
the run time of the VCG mechanism has a large variance
(the mean run time is 13.7s but the maximal run time was
34.3s). GROWRANGE averages better than 90% allocative-
efﬁciency in 50% of the worst-case VCG run time. We also
see good performance on Weighted-random, although this
proved to be an easy problem for both methods.
The Decay and Random distributions proved not to be
well suited to the anytime approach because we found lit-
tle variance in the run time of the VCG mechanism, at least
over10trials. GROWRANGE averagesonlyaround50%efﬁ-
ciency in 50% of the worst-case VCG run time. Future anal-
ysis should take additional samples to make sure that there
is indeed little variance of VCG run time on these problems.
Leyton-Brown et al. (2002) have studied the variance in
run time for CAs, given distributions from CATS (?). Their
analysis suggests a high variance in many problems. We
view this as further evidence that anytime mechanisms are
necessary in practice.4
Time-Based Interruptions
We now turn to a time-based model of interruption,in which
the center interrupts the mechanism according to some ran-
dom process
w
￿
—
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ that deﬁnes the time
w at which a
solution is required. Time-based interruptions are appeal-
ing because they allow the center to respond when chal-
lengedto providea solution,andalso becausetheycan facil-
itate the integration of cost-of-delay based models of meta-
deliberation (Horvitz 1987; Dean & Boddy 1988).
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  remains
independent of bids from agents, an agent can try to change
the progress made across this sequence by a particular time
by submitting bids that change the difﬁculty of the opti-
mization problems in each stage. Consider, for instance, an
agent that knows that it is a winner in early stages but not
in later stages. If an interrupt will come quite late, this agent
couldtrytostateatypethatslowsdowncomputationinearly
stages. Of course, this is not without drawbacks because the
agent must also be careful not to adversely change the out-
come in any stages that are searched (it’s dominant strat-
egy, contingent on a ﬁxed or random range, remains truth-
revelation).
A simple ﬁx would use an optimization algorithm with
a run time that is the same for all bids, for any given range.
4Subject to the concern, discussed in the next section, that this
variance not be accompanied by signiﬁcant opportunities for any
single agent to change the run time through its bid.
But, this approachis not appealingbecause we want to solve
easy instances quickly rather than design for the worst-case.
This is the whole motivation for an anytime approach!
Instead, we deﬁne a randomized mechanism and retain
strategyproofness with some error probability (Archer et al.
2003). We say a mechanism
= is strategyproof with error
probability
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struct our agent-independentestimator below.
Deﬁnition 4 (Consensus-Based Anytime VCG Mech.)
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Discard the results from additional computation com-
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Theorem 4 Consensus-Based Anytime VCG Mechanism,
with conservative estimator
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Also, it is important that the estimate is close to the true
5In comparison, these calculations can be skipped in the stage-
based interruption model when the solution to
￿
U
￿
￿
￿
U
￿
￿
Æ
0
￿
￿
ª
J
￿
!
￿ can be
readily inferred from
￿
U
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
m
ª
￿
￿ . For instance, in a CA this occurs
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￿ receives no items in the efﬁcient solution.number of stages completed because we must discard any
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An Agent-Independent Stage Estimator
We need an estimator
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stages that is agent independent with high probability.
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Parenthetically, we note that no estimator can be perfectly
agent independent and informative:
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tradiction.
We require two assumptions about the effect that a single
agent’s bid can have on the run time.
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Assumption 2 (
ı -bounded single-agent slow-down) No
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Ultimately,bothassumptionscanbeempiricallyvalidated
for a domain in question. The tighter that
￿ - and
ı - are in
practice, the better the stage estimate will approximate the
actual number of stages completed when the mechanism is
interrupted.6
Following Goldberg & Hartline (2003), who use
ø
￿
œ
«
ß in
a very different context, we now deﬁne a random function
ø
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«
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￿ that is a “
￿ -consensus estimator” at time
￿ with prob-
ability
- , for some
￿
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￿ .
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Parameter
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ø
œ
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ß can be used to make a trade-off in our
mechanism between the probability,
- , that truthful bidding
is anequilibriumandtheamountof roll-backthat is required
on interruption. We discuss this further at the end of this
section.
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A function
ø with these properties is named a “consen-
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￿ of each other.
The family,
ø
œ
«
ß , is deﬁned as a family of step functions
that are ﬂat on large regions. This ensures that the second
condition for a consensus-estimator is often satisﬁed. The
relative size of these ﬂat regions (deﬁned by
￿ ) makes a
tradeoff between the probability of consensus and the ac-
curacyof the estimate.7 The selection of a random
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timator function at any
￿ :
Lemma 2 Randomlychosen
ø
œ
«
ß is a
￿ -consensusestimator
at
￿ with probability
-
￿
￿
A
￿
:
1
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
X
ß
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , for any
￿
E
˛
￿
￿ .
Proof: Tosee thiswe ﬁxan
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6Although Leyton-Brown et al. (2002) suggest that the empir-
ical hardness of winner-determination in CAs may vary by orders
of magnitude for different instances from a distribution, we are not
aware of any research that has considered the possible effect that
changing the bid from a single agent can have on run time.
7Goldberg & Hartline (2003) show there can be no function
(
that works as a consensus estimator for all values
) with certainty.*
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Figure 2: Analysis of Agent-Independent Stage Estimator.
The conservative and agent-independent stage estimator
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Deﬁnition 8 (agent-independent stage estimator) Fix
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￿ is the number of agents.
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Lemma 3 Estimator
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This leads to our main result.
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Conclusions
Anytime VCG mechanisms are proposed to provide any-
timeoptimizationwithself-interestedagentsandretainstrat-
egyproofness whenever the mechanism is interrupted and
asked for an answer. An anytime mechanism can solve easy
instances optimally, while terminating early with approxi-
mate solutions on very hard instances. In doing so, we ex-
posed an intriguing tension between ﬂexibility and strat-
egyproofness, through the analysis of agent-independent
stage estimators.
In futureworkwe intendto completean experimentalval-
idation of the time-robustness approach, together with a cal-
ibration of the
ı - and
￿ -assumptions in more realistic do-
mains. We are interested to understand the cost of providing
robustness against attempts to manipulate via run time, and
the sensitivity to the probability
- . In addition, there should
be plentyof opportunityto exploresmart methodsto expand
the range across time and to avoid duplication of effort.
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